All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

Julia Grundner
''Safe strategic voting and three approaches for choosing a strategic preference statement under the Borda Rule''
( 2018, Vol. 38 No.1 )
Numerous situations exist when a group of voters could manipulate the election´s outcome. We change one assumption for safe strategic vote of Slinko and White (2014), by allowing voters with the same top k ranks to form a manipulative group, and we analyse how to detect manipulative groups. Furthermore, we introduce possible ways to determine a strategic preference statement for such groups. We introduce a "safe" way and a "greedy" way to cast a strategic preference statement. Concluding, we use data from the 2015 Styrian parliamentary elections to apply safe strategic voting.
Keywords: Safe Strategic Vote, Coalitional Manipulation, Strategic Voting, Borda Rule
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : Dec 01 2017 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 21 2018

  This abstract has been downloaded 1091 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 149391 times