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| Julia Grundner |
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| ''Safe strategic voting and three approaches for choosing a strategic preference statement under the Borda Rule'' |
| ( 2018, Vol. 38 No.1 ) |
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| Numerous situations exist when a group of voters could manipulate the election´s outcome. We change one assumption for safe strategic vote of Slinko and White (2014), by allowing voters with the same top k ranks to form a manipulative group, and we analyse how to detect manipulative groups. Furthermore, we introduce possible ways to determine a strategic preference statement for such groups. We introduce a "safe" way and a "greedy" way to cast a strategic preference statement. Concluding, we use data from the 2015 Styrian parliamentary elections to apply safe strategic voting. |
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| Keywords: Safe Strategic Vote, Coalitional Manipulation, Strategic Voting, Borda Rule |
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
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| Manuscript Received : Dec 01 2017 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jan 21 2018 |
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