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Keiichi Morimoto
''Further Results on Preference Uncertainty and Monetary Conservatism''
( 2018, Vol. 38 No.1 )
This study re-examines the optimal delegation problem of monetary policy under preference uncertainty of the central banker. Liberal central bankers are desirable when uncertainty is strong, which is emphasized when the slope of the Phillips curve is flatter, as some empirical works report. However, appointing conservative central bankers is optimal with standard parameter values when monetary policies are conducted by committees, as in most actual economies.
Keywords: monetary policy, delegation, uncertain preferences, committee
JEL: E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
Manuscript Received : Dec 17 2017 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 23 2018

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