All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Christopher Sprague and Jeffrey Wagner
''Economic Motivations for Software Bug Bounties''
( 2018, Vol. 38 No.1 )
Some software developers sponsor bug bounty programs, whereby outside parties with comparatively lower costs are compensated for finding bugs. We propose a basic model of why some developers offer bounties while others don't, and why those that do offer bounties typically outsource only a portion of the bug-finding. Our relatively basic framework and preliminary result can support further investigation of public policy instruments, such as products liability law, aimed at modulating software failures that may have large public impacts.
Keywords: Bug bounty, software bug bounties
JEL: K2 - Regulation and Business Law: General
L8 - Industry Studies: Services: General
Manuscript Received : Dec 31 2017 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 23 2018

  This abstract has been downloaded 988 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 156037 times