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ralph lauren polo

Liang Mao
''A note on stable cartels''
( 2018, Vol. 38 No.3 )
Non-cooperative cartel formation games usually carry the assumption that cartel members will maximize their joint payoffs. Through an example, this note shows that this assumption is problematic because it imposes some unnecessary restrictions on cartel members' actions.
Keywords: cartel formation, stable cartel, self-enforcing agreement
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
Manuscript Received : Feb 14 2018 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 18 2018

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