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| Marc Escrihuela-Villar and Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita |
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| ''A note on the privatization neutrality result with colluding private firms'' |
| ( 2018, Vol. 38 No.4 ) |
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| In a mixed quantity-setting oligopoly, we investigate the welfare effects of privatization in the presence of an optimal output subsidy. We find that the privatization neutrality result is not satisfied whenever there is at least some cooperation between the private firms. Our result suggests that the degree of cooperation between private firms reduces the government incentives to privatize the public firm. In addition, if a consumer surplus bias of the public firm is considered, the privatization neutrality result does not hold either, and the incentives to privatize the public firm are further reduced. |
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| Keywords: Imperfect competition; Mixed oligopoly; Partial privatization; Subsidies. |
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Jul 12 2018 | | Manuscript Accepted : Oct 30 2018 |
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