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ralph lauren polo

Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu
''Comment on “Price and quantity competition in network goods duopoly: A reversal result”''
( 2019, Vol. 39 No.3 )
Based on the utility function of Hoernig (2012), who introduces network externalities, Pal (2014) considers some of the classic issues related to Cournot and Bertrand equilibria, e.g., Singh and Vives (1984), and demonstrates that profit under Bertrand equilibrium is higher than that under Cournot equilibrium if the degree of network externalities is sufficiently large. In this note, focusing on the role of consumer expectations, i.e., active and passive expectations, of network sizes, we demonstrate that the main result of Pal (2014) does not hold under active expectations. Furthermore, we compare profits, outputs, and consumer surplus in equilibrium in the cases of active and passive expectations.
Keywords: Cournot and Bertrand competition; network externality; horizontally differentiated duopoly; fulfilled expectation; active and passive expectations
JEL: D2 - Production and Organizations: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Manuscript Received : Jan 22 2019 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 11 2019

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