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Alexey Shvedov
''A note on Cournot equilibria under incomplete information''
( 2022, Vol. 42 No.2 )
The usual assumptions that underlie the theory of Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under incomplete information are that the rivals' marginal costs are independently and identically distributed. Using a new mathematical method, this paper shows that the Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium exists under much more general conditions. An expression of equilibrium solutions is presented.
Keywords: Cournot competition; Equilibrium strategy; Incomplete information; Random variable
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Manuscript Received : Feb 11 2022 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 30 2022

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