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Alexey Shvedov |
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''A note on Cournot equilibria under incomplete information'' |
( 2022, Vol. 42 No.2 ) |
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The usual assumptions that underlie the theory of
Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under incomplete information
are that the rivals'
marginal costs are independently
and identically distributed.
Using a new mathematical method, this paper shows that the Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium exists under much more general conditions.
An expression of equilibrium solutions is presented. |
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Keywords: Cournot competition; Equilibrium strategy; Incomplete information; Random variable |
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General |
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Manuscript Received : Feb 11 2022 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jun 30 2022 |
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