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Montserrat Feré and Carolina Manzano
 
''Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium [Comment]''
( 2024, Vol. 44 No.4 )
 
 
In contrast to Dai and Sidiropoulos (2011), we show that the fiscal disciplining effect associated with central bank opacity about the central's political preference parameter present in a Stackelberg equilibrium is never observed in a Nash equilibrium.
 
 
Keywords: Distortionary taxes, output distortions, central bank transparency (opacity), fiscal disciplining effect.
JEL: E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 11 2024 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 30 2024

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