Economics Bulletin

Volume 40, Issue 4

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Citation: Donal Ajoumessi Houmpe and Ngouhouo Ibrahim, (2020) "The effect of African leaders' foreign education/training on the completion of primary education in their countries", *Economics Bulletin*, Volume 40, Issue 4, pages 3241-3255
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Submitted: September 14, 2020. **Published:** December 17, 2020.

Economics Bulletin

Submission Number: EB-20-00921

"Foreign African educated/trained leader's effect on primary completion"

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Abstract

The quest for the determinants of education in Africa has paid little attention to the role of political leaders; many of whom once received foreign scholarships. This article aims to examine the effect they have on education. We assume that foreign training encompasses factors guiding the choice of economic policies. The results of the estimation using fixed, random effect and generalized least square on a sample of 219 leaders reveal that foreign leader's studies negatively affect primary completion; the result is robust in autocracies. Studying abroad deprives leaders from their home country realities and orients them towards foreign policies.

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1. Introduction

More than 6 decades after the publication of the articles by Schultz (1960), the issue of education continues to receive a great deal of attention in both economic literature and international organisations. Indeed, it is increasingly evident that the level of education attained by the individuals who make up an economy is a major determinant of its success on the global economic scene and, therefore, of the standard of living of its citizens. On the one hand, the developed nations (DPs) are now seeking to establish themselves as "tank" of highly skilled labour, thus exploiting their competitive advantages in the face of abundant, cheap and generally low labour. Poorly educated developing countries (DCs); which confirm the strategic nature of education acquired in international exchanges. On the other hand, we now know that the accumulation of human capital contributes in the same way as that of physical capital to long-term economic growth (Holsinger, 2009).

According to UNCTAD statistics, over the period from 2002 to 2012, Africa experienced an economic growth rate of 4.9% above the world average (2.6%), thus ranking second among developing economies behind Asian economies (7.3%). However, it lags behind all other regions on most development indicators (Sundaram et al, 2011). Average per capita income hovers around that of the 1970s and rates of exclusion from education are the highest in the world (UIS, 2015). As a result, of the 95 million young workers, only a third have the basic skills needed to be competitive in the labour market and less than 20% of young people can find paid employment (Page, 2013). In addition to these disturbing figures, Africa is also home to the world's fastest growing youth. This will translate into eleven million young people entering the workforce each year for the next decade. Many studies have focused on the factors that may explain this poor performance in the supply of education in Africa. Although there is debate as to the effect of certain variables including the level of corruption, political stability, ethnic split, levels of inequality and development assistance on the level of education, there is a consensus on the negative effect of the low level of per capita income on the level of education in developing countries. However, within its countries, particularly in Africa, many stand out considerably, such as Zimbabwe, which in 1990 spent four times as much on education as Zambia and Malawi. Zimbabwe now dominates sub-Saharan Africa in terms of literacy rates (Swainson, 1995); followed by Rwanda, which over the last decade has seen a 20-fold increase in secondary school enrolment rates with efforts to increase gender equality (Olzacki, 2017). Hence the question of knowing what motivates some governments to orient their development policies more towards education than others? Specifically, we believe that the political leader background plays a primordial role in the intellectual construction of his country, because:

Firstly, education is a public good, as is internal and external security, the provision of which is the responsibility of the executive in its auxiliary functions of ensuring public order (Adam Smith, 1776). However, it is not for this author to take into account the positive externality effects of education in terms of productivity or growth. Education, according to Adam Smith, reinforces order and the stability of power; which he describes as follows: "An educated and intelligent people are always more decent in their conduct and better disposed to order, than an ignorant and stupid people, [...], they are less disposed to let themselves be drawn into any indiscreet or unnecessary opposition to government measures[1]". In this regard, African leaders in order to better consolidate their power will invest more in education to prevent

[1] Smith, A. Investigations on the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776, Book V, Chapter I

social tensions and not to build an intellectual elite capable of challenging their authority (Acemuglu, 2008). The issue of the quality of education is thus highlighted. Countries dependent on natural resources (oil in particular) are marked by longevity in the power of leaders and a high concentration of learners in rent sectors (Omgba and Ebeke, 2011). Data from Sub-Saharan Africa shows that political leaders are the main drivers of education policies and investments. Thus, the "lack of financial resources" leads African leaders to arbitrate in the investment of different sectors. Two major ones generally attract attention: infrastructure (water, electricity, transport, etc.) and the population (education, high birth rate, health, etc.). "Public investments in education and infrastructure can yield much greater benefits in stimulating long-term growth because they are highly complementary. Investing in physical and human capital can be costly. Policymakers must therefore take into account the implications for public finances and the macroeconomic and distributive effects[2]".

Finally, leaders frequently cite their own educational experience as guiding their decision to prioritize education. For example, Rwandan President Paul Kagame cites his experience of attending a school in Uganda and Rwanda without proper books, inadequate buildings and understaffed teachers as motivation to ensure access to education for all Rwandan citizens. (Kagame, 2007). If he had not directly experienced his country's education system, could this have changed his determination to give more priority to national education in Rwanda?

Existing literature relating leader background to social factors in a broad sense and specifically education has been developed at the sub-national level and in democratic bodies; it is based on candidate-citizen theory. The candidate-citizen approach is an innovative model of electoral competition in which the number of candidates is endogenized. The candidates are citizens with preferences of their own who decide to participate in the election despite the costs of the campaign. In this approach, the political game puts citizens in competition for the occupation of public responsibilities, where selection based on qualifications, virtue, preferences, can affect the results of economic policies (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). Thus, voters tend to be more interested in the values of the person leading the political party than in the ideology and/or program advocated by the latter.

Using data on Finnish politicians, Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011) find that a higher salary attracts better quality female candidates, while no effect is detected among men. They measure quality through education and professional qualifications. Thus, (Djankov et al. 2003, Glaeser et al. 2004, Fortunato and Panizza, 2011) show that the education of elected officials is positively correlated with the quality of government and discuss the impact of the latter in promoting development economic. An analysis of the effect of the 1993 law on quotas for women in Italian municipalities shows that gender quotas are associated with a higher average number of years of schooling for elected officials, with an effect ranging from 0.12 to 0.18 years of education (Audinga Baltrunaite et al, 2012); This effect is due not only to the higher number of elected women, who are on average more educated than their male colleagues but also to the lower number of poorly educated elected men.

Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) are interested in the influence of the representativeness of women in local councils in India on the types of public goods provided locally. They show that board members invest more in infrastructure directly related to the needs of their own gender. According to their results, women invest more in infrastructures such as water and roads while men in education. Similarly, Svaleryd (2009) checks the effect

[2] African Economic Outlook 2020, page 113, third bullet point.

of the representativeness of women in Swedish local councils on the structure of local public expenditure and finds a positive relationship between the share of women in local councils and childcare expenditure and education in the care of the elderly.

Nationally, few women in the world have held national leadership positions. The existing literature maintains that the more a country converges from a less educated leader to a more educated one, the level of income increases (Timoty Besley et al, 2011). Likewise for Luiz Diaz Serrano and Jessica Pérez (2013), the transition in a country from a less educated leader to one more educated increases the primary completion rate. However, these authors do not take into account the place of education of the political leader. Yet for academics like Constant et al (2010), foreign-trained leaders are more likely to create solid human relationships, attract more foreign investment, become familiar with development theories, advocate for education. , thus once at home, will opt for high public spending on education. However, a theoretical contrast suggests that subjective experiences shape perceptions; and leaders far removed from higher education systems in their home countries end up being less aware of local needs and deficiencies, and potentially adopt strategies oriented towards outside.

Given that 43.89% of African leaders have carried out at least part of their higher education or have completed their military and/or professional training abroad, our study aims to verify whether this feature has a positive effect. , negative or zero on the national level of education.

In addition to this introductory section, the rest of this article is organised as follows, section two describes the empirical approach and data, section three presents the results and interpretation and section four summarizes the findings of the study.

2. Empirical approach and data

Data on political leaders contain information on 46 African countries over the period from 1975 to 2015. The choice of this period is in the perspective of integrating as many independent countries as possible while keeping the goal of having at least two leaders who have succeeded in power in each country. To determine the chief ruler of each country in different years, we use the Archigos database. In the case where one or more leaders share the same year, we retain the one who in months has the most duration in power during the latter. The educational performance in a country has made years of achievements, we only retain leaders who have spent at least three years in power. This choice is also explained by the fact that in Africa the leaders who have served less than three years and in power are for the majority of transitional presidents who could be less interested in education because far from their objectives. Another possibility of the short tenure would be the political instability defined by a coup d'état that could weaken the education system.

Information on the educational and training pathways of African leaders has been collected from several sources including the Library of Congress, African political leader history, Timothy Besley et al, Constance ... Two main information has received our attention: the level of the leader's highest education and/or training, and the country where he completed his education and/or training. The construction of the leader's education level variable is inspired by Besley et al (2011). This variable is discrete takes values from 1 to 8 "Unknown (no information); Literate (no formal education); primary school or tutors; high school/finishing/secondary/vocational school; special training (beyond high school), such as mechanical, nursing, art, music or military school; University; higher or vocational school (eg

master's degree); doctorate (eg PhD) "; from this variable we have generated, in accordance with Besley, another variable which designates university studies; the latter taking the value 1 if the level of education is greater than or equal to 6 and 0 if the reverse; this variable also allows us to capture, per Silja Göhlmann and Roland Vaubel, (2007) the field of study.

Two reasons justified the departure of African leaders towards other horizons: some received scholarships from the mother country or other countries and others went to complete their military training (especially those recognized having at least completed secondary). Therefore, we define the vector of explanatory variables of interest (AWAY); study or train outside that captures the fact that a leader has completed his or her higher education or completed professional training outside their native country. Two destinations were selected: the west represented by the variable (western) taking the value 1 if the leader finished his studies in Europe, America, Asia and 0 if the opposite; then Africa represented by the variable (Africa) coded 1 if the leader completed his studies in an African country other than his native country and 0 if not.

The dependent variable, in this case, the primary completion rate is a ratio expressed as a percentage of the total number of new admissions in the last year of primary compared to the number of the theoretical age population entering the last level of primary. It is calculated as follows: (total number of pupils in the last year of primary school - number of repeaters) / total number of children officially of age to have a primary school diploma. This ratio could exceed 1 due to children above or below the official age who entered primary school prematurely or late or who have resumed. The choice of this variable to capture education is due to its accessibility for several African countries in different periods regardless of the quality of institutions. Carl Henrik Knutsen, (2011) in a comparison of political regimes in his thesis recalls that the supply of primary education is identical in the different political regimes.

For control variables, we use institutional variables such as the perception index of democracy from the Polity IV database. It provides several variables, which capture different dimensions of democracy, including the degree of competitiveness and openness in recruiting leaders; this base variable (POLITY2) goes from 10 to -10. We define a country as democratic if the variable POLITY2 is positive (Persson and Tabellini, 2006); macroeconomics variables such as per capita income from the Maddison Project Database (2018) the only widely available data that is covered for a sufficiently long period of time, Official Development Assistance and government expenditure on education taken from the World Development Indicator (WDI). Table 1 below describes the variables used.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Primary	1834	55.003	24.619	-.888	125.323
Foreign Aid	1834	10.77	11.244	-1.063	94.946
Spend	1834	4.345	2.365	-1.978	44.334
polity2	1833	-1.576	6.023	-10	10
Growth	1834	7.671	.852	5.017	10.75
Western	1834	.514	.5	0	1
Africa	1834	.19	.392	0	1
Tenure	1834	10.691	8.328	1	42
Age	1834	55.845	11.572	18	91
College	1975	.507	.5	0	1

Source: Author‟s construction

The data in this table are averages and frequencies. Descriptive statistics are limited to the variables of interest. Over the four sub-periods, we observe the fall in the number of autocracies compared to democracies; as well as the frequency of coups d'état. Primary completion rates are generally increasing in the continent over its periods. The evolution of democratization is synchronous with that of education. The table also allows us to observe a growing rise to power of increasingly educated leaders. Between 1975 and 2010, the least educated leader in Africa had a level 4 on our scale with a very low percentage. Specifically, the holders of a master's or an engineering degree represented the largest proportion of leaders in Africa from the 2010s. Over this same period, leaders who studied abroad represented a just over 66% against 33% of leaders trained in the country or Sub-Saharan Africa. Growth and education rates over the same period are the highest. A priori one could hastily conclude that the dazzling economic performance is the fruit of the intellectualization of the ruling class. However, an observation of the individual performance of each level of its leaders shows that the education rate is higher when the leaders of the 6th are in power. Its leaders are characterized for many although having carried out studies outside, did not prolong it, the latter spent more time of their training in their native country unlike those of level 7 and 8. Those trained in their native country or the sub-region, unlike their counterpart trained abroad. This, therefore, calls into question the hypothesis that economic success, albeit marginal in the last decades, has been attributed to the most educated political elite. Could this be the fruit of democratization, although much contested by political authorities? From Table 1 above, we observe that democracies are more educated than non-democratic regimes. Even better, when power is acquired through the ballot box, the primary completion rate is higher than when it is acquired through unconstitutional means. The estimates in the next section will tell us more. NB: this description is taken from Table 2 and the figure in the appendix.

2.1. Econometric model and empirical analysis

The econometric model is written:

$$\boldsymbol{PA_{ilt} = \alpha + \beta AWAY_{ilt} + \delta L_{ilt} + \lambda_l + \mu_i + \theta Z_{ilt} + \varepsilon_{ilt}} \quad \textbf{(1)}$$

With PA_{ilt} representing the primary completion rate of the country, i at period, t when leader, l is in power; $AWAY_{ilt}$ designates the matrix of variables of interest to study in the West and in Africa from leader, l to the period, t in the country, i; Reads the matrix of variables describing the other characteristics of the political leader, namely: his age, length of time in power, and level of education; Z_{ilt} is the vector of explanatory variables of the country's economic structure. μ_i represents the country fixed effect. Since we assume that the leader's profile does not change during his tenure, we include the leader's specific fixed effect. It could turn out that λ_l captures two effects: the heterogeneity of the profile of the leaders and the other characteristics not observed in Z. since a leader can only be in power in one country, the leader's-specific fixed effect is confused with the country-specific fixed effect. ε_{ilt} the error term related to each period; the coefficients α, β, δ and θ are the parameters to be estimated.

The coefficient on which our hypothesis is built is β, which captures the interest of leaders trained abroad in education.

The length of time the leader has been in office represents political stability and tells about the experience of a president. A young leader will have political preferences different from those of an old president insofar as the latter has a long political career to preserve unlike the more experienced old; age also informs about the latter's ability (Alberto Alesina et al, 2019). The president's education level is an important factor in the growth process; a president with higher education would have become familiar with development theories making him a driver of growth in his country (Besley et al, 2011). The level of democracy here tells us about the institutional constraints facing the leader; the presidents of autocracies would be freer in their political choices and the implementation of these (Jones and Oklen, 2005; Barro, 1999). In

Africa, official development assistance is a very large proportion of public resources received their training in France would have development policies turned outward to this end could attract more external financial flows (Page, 2013; Constante et al, 2010). The allocation of public spending remains one of the indicators to measure the interest that the political leader places in a sector; in some communities around the world, women leaders allocate less funding to education compared to their male counterparts in contrast to other regions (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Svaleryd, 2009). Since there is a time gap between decision making and its macroeconomic effects, we delay public spending on education by two periods; because of the collinearity between the expenditure of year t and that of year t + 1, we only retain this lagged variable.

Four econometric methods were used to estimate the previous equation namely: the fixed effect method, the random effect method, generalized least squares (GLS) and the Driscoll-Kraay method. The use of these methods is for the following reasons: tests on the residuals of the regression by the random-effect method reveal the presence of serial autocorrelation and heteroscedastic; this is therefore corrected by the GLS. However, since the Hausman test revealed that the fixed-effect model is preferred over the random-effect model, GLS are no longer sufficient because only corrects for random effects. Hence we use of the Driscoll-Kraay method under the assumption of the presence of independence of individuals.

3. Result

Our results are presented in two stages. Firstly, we present the basic results obtained by estimating foreign education as measured by western and African studies on the national level of education measured by primary attainment. In a second step, we present the results of the sensitivity tests by grouping countries into two samples: democratic and non-democratic countries.

3.1. Basic result

Table 3 below presents the results of the estimation of equation 1 by the fixed effect method (column 1), by the random effect method (column 2), the GLS (column 3) and the Driscoll-Kraay (column 4).

Table 3: effect of foreign educated leaders on primary attainment

	(fe)	(re)	(GLS)	(Driscoll-Kraay)
VARIABLES	Education	education	Education	Education
Foreign Aid	-0.185***	-0.184***	-0.219***	-0.185***
	(0.0394)	(0.0392)	(0.0459)	(0.0391)
Lag2.spending	0.598***	0.678***	2.060***	0.598**
	(0.188)	(0.186)	(0.200)	(0.234)
polity2	0.770***	0.766***	0.872***	0.770***
	(0.0729)	(0.0727)	(0.0901)	(0.0951)
Growth	7.712***	8.335***	13.34***	7.712***
	(0.916)	(0.883)	(0.637)	(1.151)
Western	-3.226***	-3.327***	-7.572***	-3.226***
	(0.853)	(0.851)	(1.064)	(0.934)
Africa	-2.750**	-2.612**	-2.336*	-2.750*
	(1.239)	(1.228)	(1.335)	(1.622)
Tenure	-0.189***	-0.198***	-0.298***	-0.189***

	(0.0488)	(0.0486)	(0.0627)	(0.0419)
Age	0.0580	0.0640	0.183***	0.0580
	(0.0408)	(0.0406)	(0.0471)	(0.0489)
College	-2.022**	-1.888**	0.755	-2.022*
	(0.917)	(0.911)	(1.007)	(1.106)
Constant	-1.293	-6.799	-55.40***	-1.293
	(7.373)	(7.450)	(5.412)	(9.412)
Observations	1,718	1,718	1,718	1,718
R-squared	0.187	0.5560		0.1870
Number of country	46	46	46	46

Source: Authors

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. (***, **, *) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.

Tenure in office has a negative and significant effect on the size of primary education. However, the longer a leader lasts, the less he promotes education. This result could be explained by the fact that a leader in order to maintain power has to impede any establishment of the intellectual elite (Daron Acemoglu, 2008). The effect of the leader's education level is not robust, however, there is a negative effect in 3 estimates; this result contrasts with the work of Luiz Diaz Serrano and Jessica Pérez (2013); could be justified by the place of education.

Control by macroeconomic variables reveals that public aid is reducing the size of primary education in Africa. Although it does not corroborate many analyzes in the area of education financing, this sign still has an economic impact insofar as it opens the debate on the origin and use of the funds collected. The direction of funds in the form of development aid are oriented towards oil-producing countries; however, in its countries, the level of governance remains relatively very low and the quality of the institutions as well; this environment makes the efficiency of this Aid difficult. Reinikka and Svensson's Uganda case study reveals that even when the government increases spending on education, much of the allocated resources do not reach schools; in the mid-1990s, only around 22% of earmarked funds reached schools due to corruption (Mbiti, 2016). Public spending on education has a positive and significant effect; this also reflects the very role that governments play in ensuring national education in providing access to school services to the masses (Handa, 2002; Ahlburg et al, 2004; Al-Samarrai, 2006). In developing countries, many studies show that under-education is linked to poverty and therefore to child labor; an improvement in per capita income will be accompanied by an increase in school attendance (Basu and Van, 1998).

Regarding specifically our vector of variables of interest, the results reveal that leaders who completed their education or training in the West or other African countries negatively influence the size of their country's primary schooling. This result contrasts with the theory that studying abroad allows the leader to become familiar with theories of human development (Constant et al, 2010). However, it finds its basis in the theory that studying outside the educational system of one's native country distances the learner from the inclinations of one's native country; thus encroaching on its ability to provide inclusive public services.

3.2. Robustness checks

The last few years have brought to light the role of political regimes in the growth process. In the strongman theory mentioned above, totalitarian regimes rest the functioning of the city on the shoulders of one man, the national leader. It thus appears that the less democratic regimes give more leeway to the leaders. To this end, a leader with more power would find it easier to assert his preferences (Jone Kane and Haig Patapan, 2012) than another in a democratic regime. In order to verify this approach empirically, we group the sample into two subgroups, one made up of democratic countries (polity2> 0) and the other of non-democratic countries (polity2 <0). The results of the regression by the previous four methods show that in democracies political leaders do not influence the national level of education; unlike non-democratic countries in which the results are not far removed from the previous ones (see tables 4 and 5 in the appendix), which corroborates the work of Alexander Baturo (2016).

4. Conclusion

This study sought to verify the effect that externally trained leaders could have on the level of education in African countries. To this end, we have formulated the following hypothesis: an internationally educated leader significantly affects the primary completion rate in his country. To test this hypothesis, the above equation was established and estimated using four estimation methods: the fixed effect method, the random effect method and generalized least squares, and the Driscoll-Kraay method. The results of these estimates allow us to affirm that a leader trained in the West or another African country promotes education less than one trained in his country. Our results also contribute marginally to the erection of the emerging literature on the effect of the profile of the national political leader on the development of his country.

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Appendix

Table 2: average descriptive statistics

		1975-1990	1990-2000	2000-2010	2010-2015	**primary rate**	gowth
Variables							
leaders education level	1	0.27	0	0	0	**61.79**	1.32
	2	1.63	0.43	0	0	**53.374**	1.06
	3	5.57	2.83	1.97	0	**44.53**	0.3777
	4	27.17	22.83	20.31	13.78	**51.54**	0.6770
	5	29.08	26.30	24.24	17.78	**54.07**	1.307
	6	17.93	21.74	24.89	23.56	**60.1378**	2.0982
	7	17.26	20.87	18.78	27.11	**55.264**	1.1109
	8	1.09	5	9.83	17.78	**58.07**	1.3764
place of education	foreign educated	44.78	52.83	57.17	66.52	**55.01**	1.6710
	home trained	55.22	47.17	42.83	33.48	**55.137**	0.8076
Institutions	Democracies	13.81	36.53	53	63.51	**65.03**	1.9033
	autocracies	86.19	63.47	47	36.49	**50.25**	1.2424
entry mode	Democratics	56.79	58.70	67.39	79.13	**60.73**	1.3179
	non constitutional	43.21	41.30	32.61	20.87	**45.60**	1.1643
primary rate		**49.34**	**52.18**	**60.90**	**67.48**		
Growth		0.4536	0.9226	2.5269	3.4689		

Source: author's building

Table 4: effect of foreign educated leaders on education in democratic countries

VARIABLES	(fe) Education	(re) Education	(GLS) Education	(Driscoll-Kraay) education
Foreign Aid	-0.110**	-0.105*	-0.0571	-0.0571
	(0.0561)	(0.0554)	(0.0726)	(0.105)
Lag spend	1.727***	1.800***	1.907***	1.907***
	(0.385)	(0.372)	(0.356)	(0.378)
polity2	0.135	0.163	0.448	0.448
	(0.307)	(0.297)	(0.322)	(0.348)
Growth	14.16***	14.67***	18.25***	18.25***
	(1.599)	(1.452)	(0.909)	(1.637)
Western	-1.855	-1.790	-0.496	-0.496
	(1.236)	(1.213)	(1.602)	(1.761)
Africa	-0.264	0.0245	7.728***	7.728**

	(2.279)	(2.207)	(2.351)	(2.904)
Tenure	-0.0132	-0.000121	-0.0649	-0.0649
	(0.0891)	(0.0875)	(0.117)	(0.154)
Age	0.0464	0.0404	-0.0396	-0.0396
	(0.0618)	(0.0604)	(0.0682)	(0.0554)
College	0.694	0.947	2.512	2.512
	(1.311)	(1.289)	(1.646)	(2.218)
Constant	-53.81***	-61.77***	-86.45***	-86.45***
	(12.73)	(11.78)	(7.778)	(13.16)
Observations	582	582	582	582
R-squared	0.225			0.614
Number of countryid	37	37	37	
Number of groups				37

Source: Author

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. (***, **, *) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.

Table 5: effect of foreign educated leader on education in non-democratic countries

VARIABLES	(fe) education	(re) Education	(GLS) education	(Driscoll-Kraay) education
Foreign aid	-0.0649	-0.0723	-0.320***	-0.320***
	(0.0528)	(0.0523)	(0.0584)	(0.0442)
Lagspend	0.338	0.452**	2.082***	2.082***
	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.238)	(0.412)
polity2	1.222***	1.140***	-0.0310	-0.0310
	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.248)	(0.197)
Growth	5.645***	6.536***	11.05***	11.05***
	(1.204)	(1.163)	(0.918)	(1.296)
Western	-1.988	-2.481**	-11.22***	-11.22***
	(1.274)	(1.265)	(1.421)	(0.833)
Africa	-3.024*	-3.259*	-6.594***	-6.594***
	(1.712)	(1.679)	(1.644)	(1.819)
Tenure	-0.201***	-0.221***	-0.294***	-0.294***
	(0.0650)	(0.0647)	(0.0813)	(0.0974)
Age	0.0102	0.0345	0.321***	0.321***
	(0.0622)	(0.0615)	(0.0629)	(0.0785)
College	0.552	0.472	-0.789	-0.789
	(1.389)	(1.365)	(1.290)	(0.955)
Constant	16.80*	8.417	-46.39***	-46.39***
	(10.05)	(9.910)	(7.619)	(10.61)
Observations	1,068	1,068	1,068	1,068
R-squared	0.084			0.368
Number of countryid	43	43	43	
Number of groups				43

Source: Author

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. (***, **, *) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%