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Marco Delmastro
''On the choice of incentives in firms: influence activity, monitoring technology and organizational structure''
( 2002, Vol. 12 No.2 )
Economists have offered a number of explanations on the introduction of monetary incentives within firms. These range from the classical agency model to the impact exerted by factors such as monitoring technology, influence activity and organizational structure. Numerous empirical contributions have recently provided evidence on part of this literature, especially as concerned the trade-off between incentives and insurance. However there is still much to do in order to offer a complete picture of firm's incentive system. The purpose of this paper is to provide a test to factors that have been usually underrepresented in empirical work but that may be key in favoring or inhibiting the introduction of performance bonuses.
Keywords: influence activity
JEL: L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
D2 - Production and Organizations: General
Manuscript Received : Jan 16 2002 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 22 2002

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