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| Arthur J. Robson and Philip J. Reny |
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| ''Existence of subgame perfect equilibrium with public randomization: A short proof'' |
| ( 2002, Vol. 3 No.24 ) |
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| Consider a multi-stage game where each player has a compact choice set and payoffs are continuous in all such choices. Harris, Reny and Robson (1995) prove existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium as long as a public correlation device is added to each stage. They achieve this by showing that the subgame perfect equilibium path correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. The present paper gives a short proof of existence that focuses on equilibrium payoffs rather than paths. |
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| Keywords: Existence |
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| Manuscript Received : Oct 11 2002 | | Manuscript Accepted : Oct 11 2002 |
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