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Bart Capéau and Erwin Ooghe
''Merit goods and phantom agents''
( 2003, Vol. 8 No.8 )
Besley (1988) is one of the few exceptional articles containing non-welfarist optimal tax devices. Feehan (1990) reports an error in his first-best rules. The present note argues that Besley's second-best rules optimize the welfare of phantom agents rather than the corrected welfare of real existing agents in society.
Keywords: merit goods
JEL: H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
I3 - Welfare and Poverty: General
Manuscript Received : Jul 01 2003 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 01 2003

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