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Thierry Vignolo
''When envy helps explain coordination''
( 2005, Vol. 3 No.12 )
This paper identifies a class of symmetric coordination games in which the presence of envious people helps players to coordinate on a particular strict Nash equilibrium. In these games, the selected equilibrium is always risk-dominant. We also find that envious preferences are evolutionary stable when they lead to Pareto-efficiency.
Keywords: Envy Coordination games Risk-dominance Evolutionary stability
D6 - Welfare Economics: General
Manuscript Received : Mar 09 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 09 2005

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