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| Sandro Gleave and Eberhard Feess |
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| ''Patent Licensing and Price Discrimination'' |
| ( 2006, Vol. 4 No.10 ) |
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| We extend the Kamien and Tauman model of patent licensing by introducing heterogeneous licensees that differ in their marginal costs using the licensed technology. We show that price discrimination does not necessarily ensure an efficient allocation of licenses. Moreover, it is possible that more licenses are sold without rather than with price discrimination. |
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| Keywords: Endogenous valuation |
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Feb 15 2006 | | Manuscript Accepted : Feb 27 2006 |
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