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Herrade Igersheim
''Extending Xu's results to Arrow''s Impossibility Theorem''
( 2005, Vol. 4 No.13 )
This note shows that results similar to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by a weaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) to state another version of Sen''s liberal paradox. Our result strengthens Xu''s arguments for taking into account non-welfarist information into the social-choice-theoretic framework.
Keywords: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
D6 - Welfare Economics: General
Manuscript Received : Nov 29 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 29 2005

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