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Christian At and Nathalie Chappe
''Crime timing''
( 2005, Vol. 11 No.2 )
This note develops a dynamic model of crime that determines the conditions under which it is optimal for a criminal to delay commission of a crime rather than committing it immediately. It also examines the optimal enforcement strategy in this context. We derive two results. The first is that it might be optimal to postpone a crime that is profitable now if its benefit increase quickly enough in the future and that a crime that is not yet optimal might become so in the future. The second is that it is optimal to underdeter crime.
JEL: K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Manuscript Received : Sep 08 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 13 2005

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