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| Christian At and Nathalie Chappe |
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| ''Crime timing'' |
| ( 2005, Vol. 11 No.2 ) |
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| This note develops a dynamic model of crime that determines the conditions under which it is optimal for a criminal to delay commission of a crime rather than committing it immediately. It also examines the optimal enforcement strategy in this context. We derive two results. The first is that it might be optimal to postpone a crime that is profitable now if its benefit increase quickly enough in the future and that a crime that is not yet optimal might become so in the future. The second is that it is optimal to underdeter crime. |
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| Keywords: |
JEL: K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
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| Manuscript Received : Sep 08 2005 | | Manuscript Accepted : Sep 13 2005 |
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