All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Nicolas Sahuguet
''Caps in asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information''
( 2006, Vol. 3 No.9 )
We study asymmetric all-pay auctions where two privately informed agents bid for a prize. We show that capping the bids is profitable for a designer who wants to maximize the sum of bids (revenue). This finding confims the results of Che and Gale (1998) in the context of incomplete information and completes the analysis of Gavious, Moldovanu and Sela (2002) by analyzing the case of ex-ante asymmetric players.
Keywords: All-pay auctions
Manuscript Received : Apr 06 2006 Manuscript Accepted : Apr 06 2006

  This abstract has been downloaded 2130 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 155972 times