All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

''Equal probability for the best and the assignment of identical indivisible objects''
( 2007, Vol. 4 No.8 )
We consider the problem of allocating several units of an indivisible object among agents with single-peaked utility functions. We introduce an axiom called equal probability for the best, and show that it is equivalent to both equal treatment of equals and symmetry in the presence of Pareto optimality. Moreover, we also show that the randomized uniform rule is the only randomized rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality, and equal probability for the best.
JEL: D6 - Welfare Economics: General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : Jul 27 2006 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 16 2007

  This abstract has been downloaded 2625 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 153558 times