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| David Collie and Roger Clarke |
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| ''Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly'' |
| ( 2006, Vol. 6 No.6 ) |
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| This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand duopoly. |
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| Keywords: |
JEL: F1 - Trade: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Feb 09 2006 | | Manuscript Accepted : Apr 05 2006 |
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