All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Ismail Saglam
''A Unified Theory of Implementation''
( 2007, Vol. 4 No.20 )
This paper unifies the theories of Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation. Environments considered are such that each agent's characteristics include, in addition to a specification of his private information, a commonly known type parameter, while both attributes are unknown to the designer. Each social choice correspondence (SCC) assigns a commonly known type vector to a social choice set. Conditions that fully characterize an implementable SCC in economic environments where agents are not satiated generalize and merge respective conditions in the complete information model of Danilov (1992) and the incomplete information model of Jackson (1991).
Keywords: Bayesian implementation
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : May 30 2007 Manuscript Accepted : May 30 2007

  This abstract has been downloaded 1778 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 151996 times