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Christian Klamler and Daniel Eckert
''Antipodality in committee selection''
( 2008, Vol. 4 No.1 )
In this paper we compare a minisum and a minimax procedure as suggested by Brams et al. for selecting committees from a set of candidates. Using a general geometric framework as developed by Don Saari for preference aggregation, we show that antipodality of a unique maximin and a unique minisum winner can occur for any number of candidates larger than two.
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : Nov 30 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 12 2008

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