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Ismail Saglam and Ayþe Mumcu
''Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities''
( 2008, Vol. 4 No.33 )
In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.
Keywords: One-to-one matching Stability Externalities Rationalizability
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : Nov 17 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 18 2008

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