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| Ismail Saglam and Ayþe Mumcu |
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| ''Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities'' |
| ( 2008, Vol. 4 No.33 ) |
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| In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core. |
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| Keywords: One-to-one matching Stability Externalities Rationalizability |
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Nov 17 2008 | | Manuscript Accepted : Nov 18 2008 |
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