All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Justin Ross
''A theoretical model of the distribution of teacher attention under benchmark testing.''
( 2008, Vol. 9 No.29 )
This paper provides a simple theoretical model designed to capture the targeting incentives d by benchmark testing. Under high-stakes benchmark testing, schools and teachers are judged on the fraction of students that meet some given level of educational attainment. The incentive for teachers is then to allocate their resources towards students who are on the margin of the pass/fail level of educational attainment. This behavior has some empirical support and the aim of the model is to provide a formal means of developing hypotheses for future research.
Keywords: Standardized Testing
JEL: I2 - Education: General
Manuscript Received : Dec 16 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 16 2008

  This abstract has been downloaded 1551 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 155797 times