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| Norikazu Tawara |
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| ''No-shirking Conditions in Frictional Labor Markets'' |
| ( 2008, Vol. 10 No.1 ) |
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| A matching model, combined with a shirking model of efficiency wages, is examined. It depends on sources of unemployment variation whether the no-shirking condition (NSC) tends to be binding as the unemployment rate is lower. When only productivity varies, the NSC tends to be binding as the unemployment rate is higher, as in Rocheteau (2001). However, when only matching efficiency varies, the NSC tends to be binding as the unemployment rate is lower. |
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| Keywords: |
JEL: J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Jan 13 2008 | | Manuscript Accepted : Feb 26 2008 |
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