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Axel Gautier and Dimitri Paolini
''Delegation, externalities and organizational design''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.4 )
In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.
Keywords: Delegation, Hierarchy, Asymmetric information
JEL: D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Manuscript Received : Sep 07 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 28 2009

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