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Jürgen Wiemers |
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''A Comment on "The consequences of the minimum wage
when other wages are bargained over"'' |
( 2010, Vol. 30 No.1 ) |
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Cahuc, Saint-Martin, and Zylberberg (2001) show numerically that a minimum wage hike can increase both skilled and unskilled employment in a right-to-manage wage bargaining setting. This comment demonstrates that this result crucially depends on an implicitly unrealistic choice for the skilled workers' alternative wage. |
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Keywords: Minimum wage, Wage bargaining, Employment |
JEL: J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor: General |
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Manuscript Received : Nov 17 2009 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jan 28 2010 |
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