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Jürgen Wiemers
''A Comment on "The consequences of the minimum wage when other wages are bargained over"''
( 2010, Vol. 30 No.1 )
Cahuc, Saint-Martin, and Zylberberg (2001) show numerically that a minimum wage hike can increase both skilled and unskilled employment in a right-to-manage wage bargaining setting. This comment demonstrates that this result crucially depends on an implicitly unrealistic choice for the skilled workers' alternative wage.
Keywords: Minimum wage, Wage bargaining, Employment
JEL: J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor: General
Manuscript Received : Nov 17 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 28 2010

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