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| Annalisa Vinella |
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| ''Bayesian-Nash vs dominant-strategy implementation with countervailing incentives: the two-type case'' |
| ( 2010, Vol. 30 No.1 ) |
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| We extend the principal/one-agent model with countervailing incentives to a framework in which the principal deals with two agents behaving non-cooperatively and protected by limited liability. Focusing on the two-type case, we show that, beside the situation in which first best is effected even without relying on type correlation, dominant-strategy implementation yields no penalty to the principal, with respect to Bayesian-Nash implementation, when the principal faces, on the opposite, very tight constraints. |
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| Keywords: Countervailing incentives, Type correlation, Bayesian-Nash implementation, Dominant-strategy implementation |
JEL: D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
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| Manuscript Received : Jan 06 2010 | | Manuscript Accepted : Mar 02 2010 |
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