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Eric Dehay
''In search of a selfish central banker? a note''
( 2011, Vol. 31 No.1 )
This paper extends the model of Chortareas and Miller (2003) to the case of a continuum of central banker types. We derive two main results. First, whether the central banker candidate is too selfish or not enough, he has the same incentive to accept the contract and to breach. Second, a too selfish central banker is more costly for society than a benevolent central banker.
Keywords: monetary policy delegation, contract, selfishness
JEL: E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
Manuscript Received : Dec 17 2010 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 03 2011

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