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Mohamed Jeddy and Bruno Larue
''Multiplicity of Equilibria in Multi-Unit Demand Sequential Auctions under Complete Information''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.1 )
We show that the result on the existence of a unique Nash perfect equilibrium in two-bidder multi-unit sequential second-price auctions under complete information (as in Krishna, 1993; Katzman, 1999; and Gale and Stegeman, 2001) is not robust in higher dimensional auctions. Using an example featuring three bidders competing for four objects, we found two equilibria characterized by different vectors of prices and allocations.
Keywords: sequential auctions, complete information, multiple equilibria
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
Manuscript Received : Apr 22 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 30 2012

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