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Alexander Smith
''Comment on social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.1 )
Fischbacher and Gaechter (AER, 2010) find that contributions decline in repeatedly played public good games because people are imperfect conditional cooperators who match others' contributions only partly. We re-examine the data using dynamic panel data methods and find that contributions also decline because people only partially match their own contributions from previous periods. We discuss possible interpretations.
Keywords: Public Goods, Conditional Cooperation, Dynamic Panel Data Methods
JEL: C9 - Design of Experiments: General
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
Manuscript Received : Jan 23 2012 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 21 2012

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