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Shumei Hirai
''Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Contests with Endogenous Prizes''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.4 )
This paper considers a contest with an endogenous prize, which is increasing in aggregate efforts of the players. Each player may have a different valuation of the prize and a different ability to convert expenditures to productive efforts. Under standard assumptions in the literature, we prove that there exists a unique pure Nash equilibrium in asymmetric contests with endogenous prizes.
Keywords: Contests, Endogenous prize, Existence and uniqueness
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : Aug 03 2012 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 05 2012

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