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| Yizhaq Minchuk |
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| ''Low and High Types of Bidders in Asymmetric Auctions with A General Utility Function'' |
| ( 2013, Vol. 33 No.2 ) |
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| We study asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders. We expand the results of Fibich et al. (2002) for asymmetric first-price auctions to a general utility function. We show that for low type bidders, the equality of equilibrium bids with symmetric, uniform distribution bids holds for the general case of a utility function. For high types of bidders, those with weaker distributions bid more aggressively than stronger bidders under mild assumptions of a utility function. |
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| Keywords: asymmetry, first-price auction. |
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
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| Manuscript Received : Jan 27 2013 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jun 03 2013 |
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