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Ben Ferrett and Ian Wooton
''Fiscal Competition for FDI when Bidding is Costly''
( 2013, Vol. 33 No.3 )
We introduce bidding costs into a standard model of tax/subsidy competition between two potential host countries to attract the plant of a monopoly firm. Such a bidding cost, even if it is infinitesimal, qualitatively alters the resulting equilibrium. At most one country offers fiscal inducements to the firm, and this attenuates the familiar "race to the bottom" in corporate taxes. In general, the successful host country benefits from the resulting absence of active tax/subsidy competition, at the expense of the owners of the firm in the rest of the world.
Keywords: tax/subsidy competition; foreign direct investment; bidding cost; race to the bottom.
JEL: F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business: General
H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Manuscript Received : Jul 02 2013 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 29 2013

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