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| Marco Magnani |
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| ''Why do dictators like white elephants? An application of the all-pay auction.'' |
| ( 2013, Vol. 33 No.3 ) |
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| The present paper studies the provision of big and inefficient public
investments in proprietary states. By means of these investments, whose rate of return is either nil or negative, an incumbent dictator can transfer resources to his/her supporters and obtain a head-start advantage in the contest with a challenger. These projects are realized only if they are not too inefficient and more importantly, big enough to provide a large enough head-start advantage. |
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| Keywords: Investment, Political Economy, Contests, Proprietary States. |
JEL: H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
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| Manuscript Received : Aug 30 2013 | | Manuscript Accepted : Sep 05 2013 |
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