All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Emmanuelle Taugourdeau and Jean-pierre Vidal
''The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal''
( 2014, Vol. 34 No.1 )
In this paper, we investigate the impact of leadership in a tax competition game. We show that leadership by a group of countries is pareto improving for each country (leaders and followers) compared to a Nash equilibrium outcome. In addition, a coalition of leaders is also pareto improving and this coalition is stable.
Keywords: Tax competition, Leadership, Strategic interactions
JEL: H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Manuscript Received : Sep 09 2013 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 14 2014

  This abstract has been downloaded 1368 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 153784 times