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Alexander Smith
''Modeling the dynamics of contributions and beliefs in repeated public good games''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.3 )
I estimate a simultaneous equations model of contributions and beliefs in a repeated public good game, providing causal estimates of the effect of beliefs on contributions and the effect of contributions on beliefs, also known as the “projection bias.”
Keywords: Public good game, Contributions, Beliefs, Simultaneity, Simultaneous equations
JEL: C9 - Design of Experiments: General
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
Manuscript Received : Apr 02 2015 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 11 2015

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