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| Diganta Mukherjee and Sreenivasan Subramanian |
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| ''Direct income transfers and public good provisioning:
choosing between two anti-poverty schemes'' |
| ( 2015, Vol. 35 No.3 ) |
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| In this paper, we consider the economics of choosing between two types of anti-poverty programme: targeted direct income transfers and the universal provisioning of a public good. We construct a simple analytical model to examine the issue. As might be expected, our results suggest that the choice between the two poverty-alleviation schemes would depend on the relative strengths of the productivity of public goods investment on the one hand, and the information costs of targeting benefits, on the other. |
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| Keywords: poverty, transfer, public good, budget |
JEL: I3 - Welfare and Poverty: General
H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Jun 02 2015 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jul 11 2015 |
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