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Gordon Jochem Klein
''Cartel Destabilization and Leniency Programs – Empirical Evidence''
( 2019, Vol. 39 No.3 )
This study evaluates the success of the introduction of corporate leniency programs against cartels, tackling one key problem in the existing literature of leniency program evaluation: the measurement of the effects of leniency programs on the population of detected and undetected cartels. In contrast to previous studies, the present work does not rely on strong assumptions, based on the predictions of theoretical models, to infer conclusions on the population of undetected cartels from the behavior of detected cartels. Rather, it uses a standard competition intensity measure at the industry level and identifies a significant effect of deterrence in the population of both detected and undetected cartels.
Keywords: Collusion, Antitrust, Leniency Program, Program Evaluation
JEL: L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Manuscript Received : Jul 03 2018 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 20 2019

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