All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Ahmed Waqar Qasim and Jun-ichi Itaya
''Heterogeneous Firms and Lobby Participation Decision''
( 2019, Vol. 39 No.4 )
TThe study analyzes the lobby participation decision of a firm in the heterogeneous firms model. To endogenize the lobby participation decision at firm-level, an additional stage in the standard political economy of trade policy framework has been introduced. This additional stage entails information about the lobby participation decision of a firm. By assuming fixed and sunk costs associated with lobby participation, we have shown that the firm with productivity above a threshold level can only afford to engage in the lobby. Moreover, the lobby participation decision depends not only on the participation cost but also on the market size and the benefits of lobbying. Our results conform to empirical findings related to the lobbying participation behavior of firms.
Keywords: Heterogeneous Firms, Trade Policy, Lobbying Firms
JEL: F1 - Trade: General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : Nov 07 2018 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 16 2019

  This abstract has been downloaded 935 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 153560 times