All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Lucas Campio Pinha and Marcelo José Braga
''Evaluating the effectiveness of the Brazilian Leniency Program''
( 2019, Vol. 39 No.3 )
This paper sets out to verify if the Brazilian Leniency Program is effective in fighting cartels. The literature has already confirmed the effectiveness of leniency programs in the United States and European Union, but little is known about their effects in emerging countries. A theoretical model provides the long-term prediction of the implementation of an effective leniency program: the average hazard of cartel dissolution increases in the long-run when compared to the short-run. A competing risk model for cartels judged between 1996 and 2017 was estimated, allowing the cartel to end naturally or through antitrust intervention. It was found that the Brazilian Leniency Program is effective in increasing the hazard of cartel dissolution in the long-run, thereby confirming that this policy is effective in destabilizing cartels in Brazil. As fighting cartels is a major concern in Brazil and worldwide, an understanding of the effects of leniency programs is crucial to promoting a competitive environment and preventing anticompetitive activities.
Keywords: Brazilian Leniency Program, antitrust, cartels, hazard of cartel dissolution
JEL: L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
K2 - Regulation and Business Law: General
Manuscript Received : Nov 23 2018 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 11 2019

  This abstract has been downloaded 969 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 153558 times