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Jose Miguel Abito and Cuicui Chen
''How much can we identify from repeated games?''
( 2021, Vol. 41 No.3 )
We propose a strategy to identify structural parameters in infinitely repeated games without relying on equilibrium selection assumptions. We exploit the extreme points of the equilibrium payoff set to construct bounds on the frequencies of stage game actions, which then impose restrictions on the parameters of interest. To illustrate the identification strategy, we use an infinitely repeated Prisoners Dilemma to get bounds on a utility parameter and a common discount factor.
Keywords: Identification, Repeated Games, Bounds, Multiple Equilibria, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Dynamic games
JEL: C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Manuscript Received : Dec 06 2020 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 18 2021

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