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| David Lu |
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| ''A Possible Perverse Effect of Favoritism in Asymmetric Competitions'' |
| ( 2021, Vol. 41 No.3 ) |
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| In this paper, we show that in an incomplete-information all pay auction, favoring the weaker player can perversely reduce his/her winning chance, compared to the case of standard all pay auction without favoritism. Thus, favoritism towards the weaker may not increase the winner diversity. |
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| Keywords: All pay auction, Favoritism, Incomplete information, Winner diversity. |
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Jul 10 2021 | | Manuscript Accepted : Sep 18 2021 |
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