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| Hidekazu Anno and Sui Takahashi |
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| ''A decomposition of strategy-proofness in discrete resource allocation problems'' |
| ( 2022, Vol. 42 No.1 ) |
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| This note provides a characterization of strategy-proofness in discrete resource allocation problems. Based on it, we establish a theorem that has the following two corollaries: (i) the student-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA) rule for college admission problems is strategy-proof for students and (ii) the top-trading cycles (TTC) rule for housing markets is strategy-proof. |
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| Keywords: Market design, Two-sided matching market, Indivisible goods allocation problem, Core, Strategy-proofness |
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Oct 18 2021 | | Manuscript Accepted : Feb 20 2022 |
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