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| Suguru Otani |
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| ''Individual rationality conditions of identifying matching costs in transferable utility matching games'' |
| ( 2024, Vol. 44 No.2 ) |
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| The widely applied method for measuring assortativeness in a transferable utility matching game is the matching maximum score estimation proposed by Fox (2010). This article reveals that by combining unmatched agents, transfers, and individual rationality conditions with sufficiently large penalty terms, it's possible to identify the coefficient parameter of a single common constant, i.e., matching costs in the market. |
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| Keywords: Matching, Matching cost, Individual rationality, Identification |
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Sep 18 2023 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jun 30 2024 |
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