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| Hiroyuki Komatsu |
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| ''Majority judgment and majority criterion'' |
| ( 2025, Vol. 45 No.2 ) |
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| Majority criterion says that an alternative should not be chosen if there is another alternative which majority of voters prefer to it. It is well known that this criterion is too strong: there is no social choice rule that satisfies it when there are at least three alternatives. In this paper, we show that majority judgment, reformulated as a social choice rule, satisfies a weaker variant of majority criterion, referred to as shuffling majority criterion. In addition, we show that if a social choice rule satisfies this axiom and another one concerning non-manipulability, it should pick only those alternatives with the highest "median grade". |
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| Keywords: majority judgment, rating rule, voting rule, majority criterion |
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory |
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| Manuscript Received : Jan 26 2024 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jun 30 2025 |
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