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Haruki Miyashita
 
''Establishing ownership in a lobbying contest with asymmetric information''
( 2025, Vol. 45 No.3 )
 
 
We construct an incomplete information-lobbying contest involving a defender of economic interest and an exploiter. The parameters of each lobbyist are characterized such that the defenders' interests are secured without competition. The findings reveal that the ownership of vested interests can be established without third-party arbitration when the defender's preference parameter exceeds a certain threshold, provided that the exploiter's contest competitiveness remains below a fixed level.
 
 
Keywords: Defender-exploiter game, Asymmetric information, Securing economic rents
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jun 30 2025 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 30 2025

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