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| Dolors Berga |
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| ''A note on strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences'' |
| ( 2025, Vol. 45 No.4 ) |
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| This note integrates the role of Nash independence of irrelevant alternatives with the axioms of strategy-proofness and plateau-onliness to develop a recursive procedure over the number of agents for the construction of rules characterized as a class of admissible social choice functions in one pure public good economies with single-plateaued preferences. |
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| Keywords: Strategy-proof; Single-plateaued preferences; Plateau-only; Nash Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. |
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory |
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| Manuscript Received : Dec 07 2025 | | Manuscript Accepted : Dec 30 2025 |
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