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| Weiyuan Hong |
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| ''Matching with network: introduction behaviors with respect to various incentives'' |
| ( 2026, Vol. 46 No.2 ) |
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| In this paper, we study a network-based matching problem, in which workers and firms could match with each other if there is a link between them. Based on this feature, workers strategically decide whether to introduce their linked workers (i.e., friends) to their linked firms. Crucially, we allow for distinct underlying incentives driving these introduction behaviors. The first is the individually rational incentive, which has been investigated by Ding (2023). The second is the external incentive, which has remained unexplored in the existing literature. This external incentive can be interpreted as either a psychological benefit or an external reward resulting from a successful introduction. Our findings regarding the external incentive provide novel insights into real-world introduction behaviors that cannot be explained by pure individual rationality. Furthermore, our results regarding the relationship between network efficiency and introduction-stability contrast with previous studies; specifically, we demonstrate that network efficiency and introduction-stability coincide under specific network structures. |
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| Keywords: Matching, Network, Introductions, Introduction-stability, Efficiency |
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Feb 02 2026 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jun 30 2026 |
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