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Vincent Iehlé
CERMSEM, University Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne
 
106-112 bd de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France
 
iehle@univ-paris1.fr
 
 
Biographical Sketch:

PhD Student in Applied Mathematics in CERMSEM research lab. (Adviser Jean-Marc Bonnisseau) Teaching and Research Assistant, University Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne. Education: Post Master in Mathematical Economics, University Paris 1. Graduate School in Economics, University Paris 1. BSc in Mathematics, University Paris 6. Working Papers: Payoff-dependent Balancedness and Cores (with J.-M. Bonnisseau). Transfer rate rules and Core Selections in NTU games. Stable Pricings in Monopoly, cooperative game theoretical modelling. Non-emptiness of Bargaining Sets in NTU games.

 
Primary Research Focus:

NTU games, Balancedness Conditions, Cores of Economies, Imperfect Competition,

 
JEL Areas:
C7 : Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
C6 : Mathematical Methods and Programming: General