Vincent Iehlé CERMSEM, University Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne   106-112 bd de l'Hopital Paris Cedex 13, 75647 France   iehle@univ-paris1.fr     Biographical Sketch: PhD Student in Applied Mathematics in CERMSEM research lab. (Adviser Jean-Marc Bonnisseau) Teaching and Research Assistant, University Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne. Education: Post Master in Mathematical Economics, University Paris 1. Graduate School in Economics, University Paris 1. BSc in Mathematics, University Paris 6. Working Papers: Payoff-dependent Balancedness and Cores (with J.-M. Bonnisseau). Transfer rate rules and Core Selections in NTU games. Stable Pricings in Monopoly, cooperative game theoretical modelling. Non-emptiness of Bargaining Sets in NTU games.   Primary Research Focus: NTU games, Balancedness Conditions, Cores of Economies, Imperfect Competition,   JEL Areas: C7 : Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General C6 : Mathematical Methods and Programming: General