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| Sanjit Dhami and Ali al-Nowaihi |
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| ''Existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have other-regarding preferences'' |
| ( 2010, Vol. 12 No.5 ) |
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| In standard political economy models, voters are ''self-interested'' i.e. care only about ''own'' utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have ''other-regarding preferences'' (ORP), i.e., in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payoffs relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr-Schmidt (1999). In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit ''envy'' and ''altruism'', in addition to the standard concern for ''own utility''. We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences. |
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| Keywords: Redistribution, other regarding preferences, single crossing property. |
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
D6 - Welfare Economics: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Jun 19 2008 | | Manuscript Accepted : Mar 07 2012 |
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